

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 05/02/2017

[REDACTED] Ali KOURANI (KOURANI) was interviewed at Seton Hall University School of Law in Newark, New Jersey. Also present was KOURANI's attorney, Mark DENBEAUX (DENBEAUX), who initially contacted interviewing agents to request this meeting on KOURANI's behalf. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, KOURANI provided the following information:

[REDACTED] KOURANI was recruited by Hizballah's External Security Organization (ESO) in 2008. KOURANI stated that he previously told interviewing agents he was recruited in 2010 because he did not want them to know he was an ESO member before he obtained his U.S. citizenship in April 2009. KOURANI further stated in 2008 he was told by his ESO handler, FADI, to obtain U.S. citizenship and U.S. passport as soon as possible. KOURANI advised he was not operationally tasked in the U.S. prior to obtaining his citizenship because FADI wanted to ensure he obtained his citizenship without issue. Accordingly, KOURANI stated the timeline of operational activities previously provided to interviewing agents at earlier meetings, was accurate.

[REDACTED] When KOURANI returned to Lebanon he would contact his handler, FADI. KOURANI called Lebanese phone number 01-280-001 to notify FADI that he had returned to Lebanon. KOURANI understood the phone number to be a pager system. Once the number connected he would enter two codes, a four digit code, 5400, and a three digit code, either 961 or 963. KOURANI did not know the significance or meaning of this second set of numbers. This pager contact would signal to FADI that KOURANI had returned to Lebanon and was available for debriefing. FADI would then contact KOURANI through his brother's or father's cellular telephone within 48 hours to set up a meeting. KOURANI never dialed this pager number from his personal cellular phone, but instead utilized either pay phones or phone banks in the airport or Beirut area. [KOURANI wrote down this pager number for interviewing agents. His note has been attached as a 1A]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Investigation on 04/26/2017 at Newark, New Jersey, United States (In Person)

File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 04/27/2017

by COSTELLO JOSEPH THOMAS, SHANNON KERI A

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Continuation of F [REDACTED] interview of Ali KOURANI On [REDACTED] KOURANI stated he often utilized Whatsapp but was aware that either Hizballah or the U.S. Government could "do things" with whatsapp.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated he also utilized the following email accounts:

- jacob.kouran@gmail.com
- holy.smoke.shop.franklin@gmail.com
- holybodyjewelry@gmail.com
- wmc.sportswear@gmail.com
- alikuku@gmail.com
- jacobsfashion@hotmail.com
- a.kourani@seahorseexpress.com

[REDACTED] KOURANI also maintains a Facebook account under the name "Ali KOURANI" which he had registered under the jacob.kouran@gmail.com address.

[REDACTED] KOURANI also knew and referred to FADI as "Hajj."

[REDACTED] Early in his recruitment in 2008 or 2009 FADI asked KOURANI to provide him with the name of a childhood friend who was unaffiliated with Hizballah. KOURANI provided FADI the name "Hilal KADAD," an individual who went to school with KOURANI who was not known to be a Hizballah member. KOURANI believed KADAD resided in the United Arab Emirates. FADI then created an email account under the name Hilal KADAD and utilized it to send KOURANI emails checking on his status while KOURANI was in the U.S. KOURANI stated this was to ensure that when he received emails from FADI utilizing pre-established paroles, such as job or marriage opportunities, it would appear natural coming from a childhood friend. KOURANI stated he did not remember the specific email address or internet provider in which FADI set up these accounts. KOURANI reaffirmed the email accounts these messages were sent to were ali.m.kourani@gmail.com and alikuku@hotmail.com. KOURANI stated he would immediately delete these emails upon receiving them because he knew they were operational emails connected to his ESO activities.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated he only owned two laptop computers while living in the U.S., one Apple laptop which he still owns and a Toshiba laptop which was destroyed when his daughter spilled something on it. KOURANI keeps his laptop in his home. KOURANI would utilize either his laptop or cellular telephone, which he kept either on his person or in his home, to check for emails from FADI. KOURANI stated he was not concerned about checking these emails from his home because they were designed to look normal.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Ali KOURANI, On 04/26 /2017, Page 3 of 11

[REDACTED] Kourani was the only recipient on operational emails, his handler did not cc or include additional people on any of these communications. Additionally, KOURANI did not believe he received any operational emails after 2012.

[REDACTED] KOURANI utilized the alias "Jacob KOURAN" in the counterfeit clothing business and stated it was unrelated to his ESO activity. KOURANI also worked for approximately one to two months for an import and export company, "Seahorse Express." KOURANI stated the owner of the company, "Danny NASSER" a/k/a "Danny NASSERDINE" ships cars to Cotonou, Benin. KOURANI stated NASSER does not take part in illegal activity but that individuals he works with may traffic in stolen vehicles or stolen vehicle parts.

[REDACTED] KOURANI expanded on the tasking he received in 2010 concerning his mission in the U.S. KOURANI stated in addition to gathering intelligence on U.S. military and intelligence outposts, he was also tasked to provide information on the security surrounding the Israeli consulate in New York and to identify Jewish businessmen in the New York City area who were former or current members of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Specifically, FADI tasked KOURANI to identify former high ranking IDF veterans of the 2006 war in Lebanon. KOURANI stated he was tasked by FADI to identify these individuals for either assassination or recruitment purposes. FADI told KOURANI that the ESO wanted phone numbers, addresses, business information and email addresses associated with these individuals. KOURANI was encouraged by FADI to develop professional relationships with these individuals in a setting that would not be suspicious. KOURANI stated the assassination of high ranking IDF members would be retribution for the 2008 killing of Imad MUGHNIYAH. KOURANI further stated the ESO preferred to assassinate a high ranking Israeli official rather than civilians. KOURANI stated he thought the mission to obtain information on the Israeli consulate was too risky and did not complete this mission. KOURANI did query "IDF" in the business networking website LinkedIn and found multiple individuals in New York. He stated to interviewing agents that he did not provide any specific individuals to FADI but did tell him how IDF veterans could be easily identified through LinkedIn. KOURANI also identified a locksmith in New York City who was of Israeli descent and called him, but conducted no further action related to this individual.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated striking Israeli targets in the U.S. is a low priority for the ESO. The ESO would prefer to target Israelis in Eastern Europe, as it is less risky for the ESO than operating in the U.S.

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] KOURANI stated that the Google image of 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New York, which he provided to the ESO also contained the offices of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). KOURANI stated he was aware his paperwork for his naturalization was processed by this office. KOURANI further stated he knew USCIS was there as he also had visited it for himself and other family member's, including his mother's, immigration issues.

[REDACTED] KOURANI provided further details regarding his 2011 tactical training. In July 2011, KOURANI attended tactics and small arms training in "Birkat Jabrur" in Lebanon. [Interviewing agents had previously understood "Birkat Jabrur" to be "Burka Akbur." KOURANI clarified the correct spelling and wrote it down for interviewing agents in Arabic. This note has been uploaded as a 1A.] KOURANI was picked up in a large van, likely a Japanese model, with blacked-out windows in Nabatieh, Lebanon and driven approximately 90 minutes to "Birkat Jabrur." KOURANI stated he carried a newspaper and was at a predesignated area in Nabatieh so the van driver knew who he was. Once the van stopped KOURANI would enter the front passenger seat where he would be handed a black, balaclava style mask and told to get in the back of the van. There was a black curtain that separated the front seats of the van from the passenger seats in the back. The driver then picked up other trainees who went through the same process. KOURANI stated there were a total of 20 to 25 trainees and three to four instructors. Only approximately five or six trainees arrived in the same van as KOURANI, the rest arrived in separate vans. The training lasted approximately two days and he stayed at "Birkat Jabrur" for two nights. KOURANI stated the trainees slept in trenches while the instructors slept in a small building on the grounds. KOURANI described the area as full of coniferous trees and featured a rifle range where the trainees trained on small arms. KOURANI did not think the instructors lived there full time but only when they were conducting training. KOURANI further stated he thinks the instructors trained both ESO members and other elite Hizballah units in tactics and small arms.

[REDACTED] Interviewing agents provided KOURANI with a series of pictures printed from open source searches of the firearms KOURANI had previously indicated he was trained on by the ESO while in Lebanon. KOURANI was asked by interviewing agents to initial the images he recognized as the firearms he trained on. KOURANI did not want his initials on the documents in case Hizballah or 910 were to discover his cooperation with the FBI, so he requested DENBEAUX make an "X" or "*" on the images he positively identified. KOURANI's responses to the corresponding photographs are as follows:

[REDACTED]

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weapon with both semi-automatic and automatic fire that he trained with. KOURANI further stated the MP-5 he fired took the same ammunition that the Glock pistol he trained on. KOURANI stated he fired this in July 2011 in "Birkat Jabrur" as part of his ESO training.

- #3: KOURANI positively identified this image as an "RPG" and "grenade launcher." KOURANI stated he fired this in July 2011 in "Birkat Jabrur" as part of his ESO training.
- #17: KOURANI positively identified this image as a "PKS." KOURANI stated this was a Russian made belt-fed weapon that he could only fire in automatic mode. KOURANI stated to interviewing agents he understood "automatic fire" to mean he could hold the trigger down and fire more than one shot without resetting the trigger. KOURANI stated he fired this in July 2011 in "Birkat Jabrur" as part of his ESO training.
- #27: KOURANI positively identified this image as an "AK-47." KOURANI stated he was issued one of these his entire time at "Birkat Jabrur" as part of his ESO training in July 2011. KOURANI stated he carried it with him during the entirety of this training to include sleeping alongside it. KOURANI stated his AK-47 was select fire and he fired it in both automatic and semiautomatic. KOURANI stated the instructors at the training taught him and other trainees to try to only fire the weapon in semiautomatic, as it is more accurate. KOURANI stated they were unhappy with him when fired it on automatic.
- #89: KOURANI positively identified this image as a "Glock" handgun. KOURANI stated this is his favorite gun and fired it in his July 2011 ESO training in "Birkat Jabrur."

[REDACTED] Copies of all of the images shown to KOURANI have been uploaded as a 1A to this 302.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated his brother-in-law, Bachir KOURANI never knew KOURANI was in the ESO. Furthermore, KOURANI stated he would never discuss Hizballah matters openly with someone like Bachir KOURANI, especially on the telephone. KOURANI did state that at one time during a business dispute Bachir KOURANI threatened to tell U.S. or Canadian authorities that KOURANI was Hizballah, but KOURANI understood this to be a baseless threat and unrelated to any actual knowledge of KOURANI's affiliation with the ESO.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated that following Imad MUGHNIYAH's death in 2008, the ESO was desperate to recruit more members to avenge MUGHNIYAH's assassination. KOURANI stated that the ESO was trying to copy the Israeli Mossad and sought to recruit "sleepers." KOURANI stated these "sleepers" were tasked to maintain ostensibly normal lives the world over who could be tasked with operational activity should the ESO decide to take action.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Ali KOURANI On [REDACTED] KOURANI stated the

[REDACTED] lized the example of a Lebanese physician. KOURANI stated the physician could be a secret ESO member and a medical doctor at the same time. He further stated this physician would be expected to pass intelligence on a patient if the patient was a member of an Israeli security apparatus, such as the Mossad or the IDF. KOURANI stated this intelligence could be as simple as the individual's phone number.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated his friend Ali SROUR, who knows of KOURANI's ESO membership, utilizes Whatsapp selector 03102161. In Lebanon in 2015 SROUR asked KOURANI why he applied for a job with the New York City Police Department (NYPD). KOURANI was surprised that SROUR knew of KOURANI's application to the NYPD and told SROUR he never actually worked for the NYPD.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated that the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF), are majority Sunni Muslims, but they have a unit of Shia Muslims who actively investigate Hizballah.

[REDACTED] KOURANI provided agents with approximately fifteen names of individuals from his telephone contact list he felt would be of interest to the FBI for varying reasons. Some of the individuals identified were possible ESO operatives living in the New York area and others were identified as Hizballah sympathizers with possible ties to Hizballah militia or clerical members:

- Mousa SHAHIN: KOURANI stated SHAHIN is a possible ESO member in the New York area from Yaroun, Lebanon. KOURANI's father, Muhammad, knows SHAHIN and SHAHIN's family are closely affiliated with Hizballah but in a secretive way. KOURANI further stated that SHAHIN's brother-in-law is now deceased Hizballah member Samir KUNTAR. KOURANI knew SHAHIN's wife's family, the Berjawi's, had substantial ties to high level Hizballah members as well. KOURANI stated that SHAHIN lives in Brooklyn and is involved in fraudulent credit card and business activity alongside other Lebanese Shia in New York. KOURANI stated he also knows SHAHIN as "Mousa Sheikh." KOURANI provided agents with four telephone numbers associated with SHAHIN:
 - (917) 662-8329
 - (646) 623-7030
 - (718) 678-0158
 - (718) 913-3846
- Youssef FARES: KOURANI stated FARES is a possible ESO member in the New York Area from Maroun, Lebanon. FARES has many connections to prominent Shia clerics in Lebanon who are Hizballah affiliates. KOURANI knows FARES has many issues with security at U.S. airports which he believes the ESO is aware of. The ESO may debrief FARES about questions U.S. authorities post to him when he travels.

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- ~~Baqer KOURANI: Baqer KOURANI is the brother-in-law of Youssef FARES and is from the southern suburbs of Beirut. He is closely related to the AYOUB and FARES factions of Hizballah and attended school in Toronto, Canada.~~
- Mohamad AWADA: AWADA resides in Tampa, Florida and is married to the sister of Ali KRAYEM. KRAYEM lives in New Jersey and has a brother who is a high ranking Hizballah member in Lebanon. AWADA utilizes the following telephone selector:
 - (347) 479-9148
 - Bilal KOURANI: Bilal KOURANI attended a Hizballah training camp and recently immigrated to the U.S. He utilizes the following telephone selector:
 - (347) 896-3165
 - Hassan KOURANI: Hassan KOURANI is the brother of Bilal KOURANI and maintains close relationships to prominent Shia clerics in Lebanon who are Hizballah affiliates.
 - Ali KADOOH: KADOOH resides in Fort McMurray, Canada and told KOURANI about Bilal KOURANI attending Hizballah training. KADOOH attended high school with KOURANI.
 - Ali KHRAIS: KHRAIS resides in Fort McMurray, Canada and is approximately KOURANI's age.
 - Ali SHAHIN: KOURANI stated SHAHIN is from Yaroun, Lebanon and is a friend of his brother, Moustapha KOURANI. SHAHIN works at a MetroPCS on Linden Boulevard in New York. SHAHIN utilizes the following telephone selector:
 - (212) 470-6586
 - Hassan ISMAIL: KOURANI stated ISMAIL is from the village of Beit Leif, Lebanon and is a Hizballah sympathizer. ISMAIL utilizes the following telephone selector:
 - (646) 207-3779
 - Nabil SALEH: SALEH's brother died in 2000 fighting for Hizballah.
 - Hussein NIZAM: NIZAM resides in Windsor, Canada, and has close relationship with multiple Shia Muslim clerics affiliated with Hizballah.
 - Moustapha AYOUB: AYOUB resides in Astoria, New York and is involved in credit card fraud. AYOUB is not connected to Hizballah.
 - Issan & Kamal ABDUL RASSOUL: Issan and Kamal are Brooklyn based Lebanese Shia who KOURANI believes are Hizballah sympathizers. KOURANI does not think either are members of Hizballah or the ESO.
 - Hassan YASSINE: KOURANI stated YASSINE is involved in the counterfeit clothing business in New York and utilizes the following telephone selector:
 - (917) 330-3637
 - Ali KAFARANI: KOURANI stated KAFARANI has strong connections to the Al-Khoie Mosque in Queens, New York. KOURANI does not think KAFARANI is a member of ESO, but a sympathizer due to his connections to the Al-Khoie Mosque.
 - Hussein Lufti FARES: KOURANI had no further information on FARES but stated he utilizes the following telephone selector:
 - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(646) 322-0041

- Amar KOURANI: KOURANI stated Amar KOURANI resides in Flushing, Queens and had no further information.
- Mahmoud ISSA: KOURANI had no further information in ISSA.

[REDACTED] [KOURANI wrote down 6 of these names for interviewing agents. His note has been attached as a 1A.]

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated in 2012 when he was tasked by FADI to pursue a job or develop contacts at a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) office in order to obtain fraudulent documents, he was also tasked to look into obtaining U.S. passports and their supporting documentation for the ESO. This supporting documentation included U.S. birth certificates and social security cards. KOURANI stated that the ESO would utilize these fraudulent documents to mask their operations, such as the fake identity card used in the 2012 Burgas, Bulgaria bus bombing. KOURANI further stated the ESO was consistently interested in fake or lost passports that they could utilize for operational purposes. KOURANI denied ever actually obtaining any fraudulent documents for FADI.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated he currently maintains an active Lebanese passport in his name, but keeps it in Lebanon. KOURANI stated he does so to prevent having issues with customs or security when transiting international airports.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated he knew FADI was involved in the 2012 Burgas, Bulgaria bus bombing. When KOURANI queried FADI about it during a debriefing in 2012 or 2013, FADI was somewhat unwilling to discuss it. FADI told KOURANI the less KOURANI knew the better off he would be. KOURANI believes FADI was concerned that the bombing exposed the ESO, in addition to the possibility of an Israeli "mole" in the ranks of ESO. KOURANI knew FADI was involved in many of the operations conducted by the ESO, as he believed FADI managed many of the overseas ESO members, to include all of the American and Canadian citizen ESO members.

[REDACTED] KOURANI was told by Fadi, in 2012 or shortly thereafter, to cease utilizing the pager system to contact FADI as ESO believed the system was compromised. KOURANI further stated that this was likely because of the 2012 arrest of ESO operative Houssam YACCOUB in Cyprus. KOURANI believes FADI knew YACCOUB and may of been his handler.

[REDACTED] In 2012 or 2013, FADI discussed the possibility of KOURANI obtaining external hard drives on behalf of the ESO. KOURANI stated the ESO utilized external hard drives to protect their sensitive information, as they could be easily transported and secured. KOURANI further stated

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Ali KOURANI
that the [REDACTED] O and Hizballah never kept sensitive information in offices
where they could be susceptible to unauthorized entry or theft.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated he believes ESO's "plan" for him may of been for him to become a suicide bomber. KOURANI stated that FADI always "had faith" in KOURANI, but had a disconnect with him. Further, FADI once asked KOURANI if he had filmed a will. KOURANI then stated that he had a wife and kids and was uninterested in becoming a suicide bomber. KOURANI also expressed doubts about whether this was in fact what ESO planned for him, but stated he always felt somewhat disposable to 910.

[REDACTED] Agent Note: KOURANI and DENBEAUX left the room around 2:00p.m. to obtain lunch. The interview resumed approximately 30 minutes later.

[REDACTED] KOURANI further discussed part of his initial mission for ESO in the U.S., to obtain firearms for caches in New York. KOURANI stated he developed contacts in the counterfeit clothing industry in New York who told KOURANI they could get handguns or AK-47s for him from out of state. KOURANI shared these contacts with FADI during a debriefing and FADI was unhappy with KOURANI and stated they were unreliable, given how KOURANI had identified these contacts.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated he once traveled to Roanoke, Virginia to visit a friend, Yassir BARAKAT (BARAKAT). KOURANI stated he also did business with BARAKAT, as BARAKAT maintained a counterfeit clothing store. KOURANI also discussed he once drove with his cousin, Hussein KOURANI, to an outlet mall outside Boston, Massachusetts where he purchased clothing to resell in New York.

[REDACTED] KOURANI again discussed the 2012 Burgas, Bulgaria bus bombing with interviewing agents. KOURANI stated the operation exposed its planners as ESO operatives linked to Hizballah and feels that former ESO member Mohamad SHAWRABA, contributed to the failure of the mission. KOURANI stated that his tasking in 2012 to identify methods to obtain fraudulent U.S. identification documents in the form of either passports or driver's licenses, would have been utilized in a similar fashion to the fake driver's license found with the bomber in Burgas. KOURANI stated documents like this would help keep the perpetrators from being identified by the Israelis or other individuals. KOURANI advised that the exposure of an ESO operative linked to the bombing was viewed as a failure. KOURANI further stated that SHAWRABA "fed" the Israelis information regarding the ESO in 2012. KOURANI stated that the ESO and FADI were unhappy with the Burgas bombing as retribution for the death of Imad MUGHNIYAH. KOURANI stated blowing up a bus of civilians was not adequate enough and that the ESO requires a "larger" response, such as the assassination of a high-ranking IDF or Mossad member. KOURANI further

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Ali KOURANI
[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] as aware of the possibility of U.S. involvement in MUGHNIYAH's death.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated that the ESO is not like al-Qa'ida or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). KOURANI stated unlike these groups, the ESO does not "simply target" civilians and is more strategic in its targeting.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated that in his opinion the ESO would smuggle explosives to the U.S. from Canada.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated he knew the ESO to utilize an explosive substance he knows only as "samad." KOURANI stated "samad" is popular in Lebanon. KOURANI thinks "samad" is not illegal but that it can be utilized to manufacture explosives. KOURANI stated that while attending ESO training in 2011 another trainee was bragging about the explosives training he received. This individual told KOURANI that he could make explosives out of "nothing," such as commercially available substances such as gasoline.

[REDACTED] KOURANI was tasked by FADI to research how to open businesses in New York for the ESO. These businesses were to be utilized as cover for the storage of firearms intended for ESO assassinations and attacks in the U.S. KOURANI reported back to FADI that opening a commercial business in the U.S. required a lot of personal information, such as a tax ID code, and recommended that they use storage facilities instead. KOURANI explained to FADI that he was intimately familiar with storage facilities due to his work in the counterfeit clothing business and he knew you could open up a storage facility with little supporting documentation. KOURANI further stated that the storage businesses would not ask questions if you paid the workers at the facility a few hundred dollars. KOURANI stated that he never opened any businesses or storage facilities on behalf of the ESO.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated he often utilized storage units at "All American Storage" in Long Island City, New York, located near the Queensboro Bridge. KOURANI stated he stored clothing there connected to his counterfeit clothing business. KOURANI liked this business as he knew the owners and they let him change units easily. KOURANI stated in most storage facilities if you knew the staff you could do whatever you wanted to. KOURANI also utilized a storage facility in College Point, Queen, and another on Jamaica Avenue, in Queens.

[REDACTED] During his tenure with the ESO, KOURANI thought he may have to travel internationally to help with an ESO operation. KOURANI thought

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he would [REDACTED] kely be tasked to collect intelligence on individuals or
targets internationally.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated that in 2009 he traveled to China to attend the "Canton Fair" in Guangzhou. KOURANI went to China in connection with his clothing business after meeting a Chinese American man he knew only as "Frank" who had a son, "James." KOURANI stated James was to go with him to China. KOURANI stated his father, Muhammad, went to China in 2008.

[REDACTED] During FADI's last meeting with KOURANI in early 2015 FADI told KOURANI that the ESO was "changing gears." ESO was starting to recruit Iraqi and Syrian Shia, who would fall under less suspicion by intelligence agencies as ESO members.

[REDACTED] In 2016 KOURANI visited the cleric who first recruited him into the ESO, Sheikh Hussein KOURANI. Sheikh KOURANI asked KOURANI if he had been in touch with the ESO. KOURANI stated to the cleric that he was no longer affiliated with the ESO and the cleric stated he had heard that the 910 had been dismantled. KOURANI stated to interviewing agents that he believes the cleric was told this as ESO was "ridding itself" of people associated with the unit. KOURANI believes this is because the ESO is rebuilding with new individuals who it does not want compromised by previous members who may of been compromised or connected to Mohamad SHAWRABA.

[REDACTED] KOURANI stated to interviewing agents that he was never paid by the ESO despite being offered.